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Monetary Policy Coordination: A New Empirical Approach∗
Abstract
This paper examines the degree of monetary policy coordination between major industrialized coun-
tries from a completely new perspective. The analysis uses a new data set on central bank issued
interest rate targets for 14 OECD countries. The methodology that we use decomposes the notion of
coordination into two components: (1) Do countries coordinate the timing of their monetary policy
actions? and (2) Is there coordination in the direction in which targets are changed? The answers
to these two questions are based on a newly developed dynamic discrete duration model (the autore-
gressive conditional hazard model or ACH) and on an ordered response model in event time. The
results indicate there is signiﬁcant policy coordination among these 14 countries during the 1980-1998
sample period in contrast to recent theoretical work suggesting that gains to coordination are small.
Moreover, this coordination appears to work through channels other than documented coordination
agreements.
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Coordination of national monetary policies has become a subject of renewed interest of late,
largely because of recent advances in the modeling of open economies. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000) and Benigno (2000) have begun a re-exploration of international policy coordination
using models that consider the microeconomic foundations of nominal rigidities and house-
hold welfare. On one hand, these papers point out potential beneﬁts of coordination by
internalizing terms of trade externalities. However, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) in particular
ﬁnd that the welfare gains are likely to be quantitatively small in comparison to the gains
from domestic stabilization policy. These conclusions roughly agree with ﬁndings of previous
literature using older Keynesian models, although the reasoning behind these conclusions
diﬀers.1
Despite the theoretical prediction that gains are small, there is a large empirical literature
that has claimed to ﬁnd evidence that countries do in practice coordinate their macroeco-
nomic polices to some degree. Studies focusing on the major industrial countries generally
ﬁnd evidence that the U.S. acts as a leader for policy makers in certain countries, but the
mechanisms through which this coordination takes place are often unclear. (See Dominguez
(1997), Furman and Leahy (1996), Chung (1993), Burdekin (1989), Burdekin and Burkett
(1992), and Batten and Ott (1985).) Another branch has focused on coordination among
European countries, generally ﬁnding that Germany had a limited leadership role among
European countries prior to monetary union. (See Garcia-Herrero and Thorton (1996), Kat-
simbris and Miller (1993) Biltoft and Boersch (1992), Karfakis and Moschos (1990), and
1 For a discussion of past literature on the beneﬁts of international policy coordination, see Bryant et. al.
(1988), Fischer (1988), Frankel and Rockett (1988), and Oudiz and Sachs (1984).
1Fratianni and von Hagen (1990a,b).)
It is possible that the tension between theoretical and empirical ﬁndings may reﬂect
problems in the methodology typically employed in the empirical literature. One problem is
that past studies have generally relied upon market interest rates or monetary aggregates as
indicators of policy stance. But use of market data makes it inherently diﬃcult to distinguish
policy makers’ intentions from demand disturbances in ﬁnancial markets. As a result, the
ﬁndings in some empirical studies might not indicate coordination of macroeconomic poli-
cies at all, but instead reﬂect the presence of exogenous ﬁnancial shocks common to these
countries.
A second problem is that past studies have generally relied upon vector autoregression
(VAR) analysis and Granger causality tests. But this approach requires several untested
assumptions on the causal structure of the vector processes involved. This paper will demon-
strate some particular pitfalls of applying Granger causality tests to the issue of policy coor-
dination, which have not previously been noted in the literature. In particular, a simulation
exercise demonstrates that the complicated statistical nature of interest rate targeting dis-
torts conventional tests based on the dynamic correlation structure between market interest
rates.
This paper undertakes an empirical re-exploration of policy coordination, taking advan-
tage of recent advances in econometric methods that avoid the particular problems listed
above. Most importantly, the present paper uses data on actual interest rate targets set by
each central bank rather than market rates. Hamilton and Jorda (2000) persuasively argue
that the target data for the federal funds rate are an accurate reﬂection of the stance of mon-
2etary policy. Similar arguments can be made for the target rates that we use in this paper —
they are all determined by the central bank and do not depend on demand innovations but
rather on policy considerations. The data comes from the Bank of International Settlements,
which recently has compiled the interest rate targets set by fourteen countries over the last
two decades.
These data pose special econometric challenges. First, changes in targets are spaced
irregularly in time. Second, when changes come, targets are typically modiﬁed in discrete in-
crements rather than continuously. The measurement of these types of coordination therefore
requires a newly developed class of time-series processes, called the autoregressive conditional
hazard speciﬁcation (ACH). Developed in Hamilton and Jorda (2000), this methodology al-
lows one to produce forecasts of the probability of a target change, conditional on contin-
uously updated explanatory variables, such as output growth, inﬂation, and the exchange
rate. This paper extends this procedure to include the targets of other countries as explana-
tory variables, as well as indicator variables representing explicit coordination agreements.
In addition, conditional on changing the target, a dynamic ordered response model allows
one to measure directional coordination by analyzing how the magnitude of target changes
is determined, directly allowing the eﬀects of other countries’ target changes to enter in the
conditioning set.
When applied to data on policy targets for fourteen industrialized countries, the ACH
methodology does identify clear signs of policy coordination over the period 1980-1998. Two
clusters can be identiﬁed, each respectively led by the U.S. and Germany. Much of the
coordination of European countries with Germany appears to be a response to exchange rates
3rather than a direct response to German policy per se, presumably reﬂecting the exchange
rate arrangements of the period. The countries that coordinate with the U.S., including
Germany and Japan, do so in a more direct manner, in that coordination is not simply a
response to exchange rates or to domestic macroeconomic variables that happen to be similar.
Finally, the results do not ascribe a large role to explicit coordination agreements, such as G-7
summits, but instead suggest that coordination tends to work through less explicit channels.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Data
Analyzing whether or not there is monetary policy coordination requires a measure of pol-
icy stance that can be uniformly compared across institutions and operational frameworks.
The common approach in isolating the exogenous component of a monetary indicator vari-
able typically requires that identifying assumptions be imposed on a semi-structural model.
However, there has been much recent discussion in the context of U.S. monetary models
(see Rudebusch, 1998; Sims, 1998; Evans and Kuttner, 1998) regarding the meaning and
usefulness of exogenous policy shocks measured via the structural VAR approach — the most
common way to study this type of problem. Exogenous shocks identiﬁed under alternative
speciﬁcations and methods are typically uncorrelated with one another, calling into ques-
tion the precision with which the policy component is identiﬁed, outside the context of the
estimated model.
By contrast, this paper adopts a much diﬀerent methodology. Hamilton and Jorda (2000)
propose the federal funds rate target as an alternative indicator of policy stance. The target
(for short) is an internal objective unilaterally set by the Federal Reserve. This variable
4has the advantage that it is not the outcome of the interaction of reserves exchanges in the
interbank market, nor is it subject to technical ﬂuctuations in the central bank’s balance
sheet. Rather, it is a clear statement of the Fed’s stance. We have found that a large number
of central banks in the OECD often operationalize monetary policy via an indicator variable,
similar in nature to the U.S. Federal funds rate target. This indicator variable is usually a
target for an overnight interbank lending rate or a repurchase agreement (repo) rate and is
clearly used for signalling purposes. Therefore, it is natural to take advantage of these target
data in our analysis.
What justiﬁes looking at these target rates as policy stance indicators? According to
Borio (1997) and Wrase (1998) most central banks have become more market oriented in
their implementation of policy, thus reducing reserve requirements (and the implicit tax
these often represent to the banking system) and making liquidity management more ﬂexible
by widening the range of instruments at a bank’s disposal. Consequently, as traditional open
market operations carry a more muﬄed signal, interest rate targets have become the preferred
tools with which the monetary authority transparently communicates its intentions. While
there are still signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the institutional framework at each central bank,2
we are conﬁdent that by focusing on interest rate targets rather than money aggregates or
other market based interest rates, a sharper image on policy coordination can emerge.
The data set that we have assembled for the analysis can be divided into two broad
categories: (1) high frequency, operational monetary data, typically consisting of overnight
rate targets and short-term interest rates, and (2) general macroeconomic and international
2 The reader is referred to Borio (1997) for a detailed description of each central bank’s operating proce-
dures.
5data, including GDP growth, inﬂation, and an exchange rate index — in other words, variables
that would naturally enter a central bank’s reaction function (see Taylor 1999). The ﬁnal
tally of countries, variables, samples and speciﬁcs are reported in Table 1. Figure 1 displays
the target data along with the corresponding overnight interest rate. Here we provide a
general overview.
The fourteen countries we study are: Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE),
Canada (CA), France (FR), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Netherlands (ND),
Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US). The operational monetary data was obtained directly from the Bank of International
Settlements3 . This data initially was compiled by BIS as part of an exhaustive survey:
“Monetary Policy Operating Procedures in Industrial Countries” (1997) by Claudio Borio.4
According to Borio (1997), countries fall into two broad groups: (1) U.S., Canada, Australia,
and Japan where the most representative policy variable is the overnight interbank rate; and
(2) the remaining countries in which the policy variable is usually a tender rate applicable
mainly to repos and whose maturity varies from one day to one month.
2.2 Preliminary Views on Coordination
Three central banks have traditionally dominated the international arena: the U.S. Federal
Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bundesbank (G-3). A reasonable ﬁrst look at the data
is to search for any evidence indicating that the central banks in our sample synchronize
their target changes with the actions of these three major players. The question we ask is
3 We thank Greg Sutton and the Statistical Assistance Section of the Bank of International Settlements
for providing us the data.
4 The Macro-International data was obtained from the IFS database.
6therefore: Does the probability that a given country will change its target depend on whether
or not there was a target change in either of the Japanese, German or American interest rate
targets?
Let xi
t =1if in period t, the target was changed in country i, 0 otherwise. The per-period



























Table 2 reports the average hazard h
i for each country and the change in the hazard caused by
changes in the G-3 targets. We organize the data into two frequencies, weekly and monthly,
so as to match the timing and length of the maintenance periods common in the countries
that we consider.
The results in Table 2 suggest two of the three major central banks exert a fair amount
of inﬂuence. For example, Austria changes its target, on average, once every 25 weeks.
However, if there is a change in the German Lombard rate, the probability of a target
c h a n g ei n c r e a s e st oa1i n4c h a n c e .S i m i l a r l y ,C a n a d as h o w ss t r o n gt i e st ot h eU . S .W h i l e
the average frequency of target changes is once every 8 weeks, there is a 70% chance of a
7change if the U.S. also changed its target during that week. With a few exceptions, there
aren’t big diﬀerences between the weekly and monthly frequencies. Perhaps the three more
interesting cases are Germany, Spain and the U.K. which, at a monthly frequency, show
signiﬁcant dependency on Japan, Germany and the U.S. respectively. According to this
preliminary analysis we can group countries as follows:
• U.S. Area: Australia, Canada, U.K. (maybe Italy).
• German Area: Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands (maybe Spain).
• Japanese Area: (maybe Germany).
• Not connected: Switzerland, Japan, Sweden, U.S.
It is not surprising that Germany’s group includes a list of countries that often have
been characterized as the “European core.” Italy’s absence from this listing may reﬂect the
fact that our data sample for this country (May 1991 - July 1998) is dominated by Italy’s
absence from the EMS following the 1992 crisis. The U.S. group notably includes the English
speaking countries of our sample. Note that at this stage we are unable to detect signiﬁcant
coordination among the G-3 economies of Germany, Japan and the U.S.
The last group of countries deserves additional comment. Switzerland’s measure of mon-
etary policy is the ﬂexible Lombard rate, although the primary focus of the central bank is
the volume of giro deposits. Borio (1997) thus suggests that “[...] interest rates are of limited
signiﬁcance in conveying policy intentions.” (p. 17). Similarly, Japan is the only country that
is still using a quantitative signal as a key mechanism for steering an interest rate operating
target. Sweden uses a combination of a target for interest rate tenders with variable interest
8rate auctions when markets ﬂuctuate around desirable levels (this mechanism is similar to
that used by the Bundesbank).
Although these results are suggestive, it is diﬃcult to discern at this point what motivates
these interconnections. One explanation could simply be that each group of countries tends to
face similar shocks, and that policy makers in each country are simply responding to domestic
economic conditions without any real coordination. Alternatively, countries may be acting
simultaneously in response to exchange rate ﬂuctuations due to asymmetric shocks. This
potentially may reﬂect the presence of international exchange rate arrangements or simply
a domestic preference for stable exchange rates. Our approach in the following sections
will be to try to describe each central bank’s policy rule and choice of response timing. If,
after controlling for responses to a range of domestic macroeconomic factors, we are unable to
c o n t r o lf o rt h et i m i n gc o m p o n e n t ,w ec o n c l u d ew eh a v ee v i d e n c eo fd i r e c tp o l i c yc o o r d i n a t i o n .
3 Interest Rate Dynamics, Target Setting and Coordination
This study employs a more suitable data set and more adequate econometric techniques
than previous studies of coordination. This section in particular, demonstrates that the
interest rate target-setting behavior of the central banks in our sample, modiﬁes the statistical
properties of the overnight rates and thus renders conventional VAR and Granger Causality
measures of coordination inoperative.
In this paper, we deﬁne two types of coordination after controlling for domestic and in-
ternational factors: coordination in the timing with which central banks adjust their targets,
and coordination in the direction in which the targets are adjusted. Target rates are adjusted
infrequently and typically by discrete increments rather than by a continuous amount, thus
9complicating the analysis. We discuss some of these complications below.
Analyses based on the dynamic comovement of market interest rates can be deceiving for
several reasons. For example, it is conceivable that two countries coordinate the timing of
their actions, typically adjusting their targets in the same direction in response to common,
real economy shocks (such as an oil shock) but adjusting their targets in opposite directions
in response to ﬁnancial shocks that distort their exchange rate. The averaging of these two
responses that would be common in VAR-based measures would thus tend to mask any
appearance of coordination. Conversely, most interest rate data have a root at or near unity.
It is conceptually diﬃcult to justify that interest rates have a unit root. However, from a
statistical point of view, this calls into question issues of spurious regression and cointegration
which are not commonly discussed in empirical studies of coordination.
These considerations aside, central bank, interest rate, target-setting behavior imbues
statistical characteristics in the interest rate data that make coordination diﬃcult to de-
tect, even in the most favorable of scenarios. Rudebusch (1995) demonstrated in a clever
simulation, that the manner the U.S. Federal Reserve adjusts the federal funds rate target,
justiﬁes the poor results obtained in traditional term structure regressions. In this section,
we demonstrate with an exercise similar in spirit to Rudebusch’s, that interest rate based
measures of dynamic comovement are poorly suited to uncover the relationships that may
exists among central banks.
Let rA
t and rB
t denote the overnight rate in countries A and B, respectively. Although
central banks choose a target level for the overnight rate, they have only imperfect control
over it. Therefore, the overnight rate tends to ﬂuctuate around the target level. In the U.S.,
10these deviations typically amount to only a few basis points and tend to be short lived (see
Hamilton (1996)). Accordingly, we model the overnight rate as,
ri
t = ri
t + εit εit ∼ N(0,σ2
i) i = A,B (1)
where ri
t denotes the target overnight rate. In practice, the residuals, εi, may be a general
stationary sequence, but to keep the exercise simple, we will simulate them as i.i.d. normal









t =1if the target is changed in period t, 0o t h e r w i s e ,a n d∆ri
t ∈{ k1,k 2,...,km},
reﬂecting the fact that changes in the target are done in discrete increments. Each period,
there is some probability that the target will be changed, hi
t = P(xi
t =1 |Ωt−1), which can
be interpreted as a discrete time hazard. Similarly, conditional on changing the target, the
magnitude of the change, kj, can be described by,
P(∆ri
t = kj|xi
t =1 ,Ωt−1)=P(cj−1 < ∆ri∗
t <c j|xi
t =1 ,Ωt−1) j =1 ,2,...,m (3)
with c0 = −∞,c m = ∞, and ∆ri∗
t an auxiliary latent index. To complete the simulation,
we specify a simple bivariate model for hi
t that will capture the coordination in the timing
and a bivariate model for ∆ri∗
t that will capture coordination in the direction of the change.
First, note that hi
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t, 0 otherwise, where ui
t is a uniform [0,1] random variable. The
bivariate speciﬁcation in (4) makes explicit two important features: (1) persistence in target
changes, which as we shall see in later sections, is a common feature in our data set, and
(2) policy setting in country A depends, via the parameter β, on country B’s policy setting.
If β>0, the likelihood of a target change in A increases with the likelihood of a target
change in country B. If β =0 , target setting occurs independently, and if β<0, country B’s
likelihood of a change reduces the likelihood that country A will change its target.
Similarly, to capture any coordination in the direction of changes in the target that may
occur independently from coordinating the timing, consider the following bivariate model,

   











t ∼ N(0,1) (5)
The parameters γi capture persistence in the direction of target changes, which is also a
commonly observed feature of the data, and the parameter ψ m a k e se x p l i c i tt h ec o r r e l a t i o n
in the direction in which the targets in countries A and B are changed. If ψ>0, countries
A and B tend to change their targets in the same direction, if ψ =0 , there is no relation and
if ψ<0, changes in the target tend to be in opposite directions.
The basic setup described in equations (1)-(5) establishes a well-deﬁned hierarchy: while
decisions on country B’s target are based completely on domestic information, country A’s
target timing and magnitude of changes depend on previous actions by country B whenever
β and ψ are non-zero, that is, B Granger-causes A. Table 3 contains the results of a simple
Monte-Carlo exercise in which simulated overnight rates are generated for diﬀerent parameter
values,5 using equations (1)-(5). For each combination of parameters, we generate 100 series
5 The choice of parameter values reported in Table 3 roughly corresponds to parameters that would generate
12of length 400, where the ﬁrst 100 observations are deleted to avoid initialization problems
and with initial values, rA
t = rB
t =5 % . T h e n ,o ne a c ho ft h es e r i e s ,w ep e r f o r mas t a n d a r d
Granger-causality test, collect the p-value of all these tests and report the Monte-Carlo
average. Figure 2 depicts an example of the simulated series.
Several results deserve comment. The most immediately apparent is the extraordinary
sensitivity of the Granger-causality test. Even in the quasi-ideal scenario in which there is
substantial coordination in the timing (β = 0.75) as well as coordination in the direction
(ψ =0 .75), Granger-causality tests will routinely fail to pick up these features whenever
the frequency with which the target is changed is relatively low (below 30% of the time)
and/or the central bank’s control of the overnight rate around the target is poor (σε > 0.25).
Other features of the model appear to be less important in determining this sensitivity except
perhaps the degree of persistence in the direction of the target changes (γA and γB small). It
is important to note that this failure of the Granger-causality test can occur under the most
favorable of situations, with high values of the parameters β,and ψ,with a relatively precisely
controlled overnight rate and with realistic parameters values. The Granger-causality test
metric appears to be well suited to capture directional coordination since it will detect this
type of coordination in the absence of coordination in the timing as long as the target is
changed suﬃciently often (40% of the time and above). However, even when the timing of
target changes is strongly related (β =0 .99), as the value of ψ decreases, even slightly (from
0.75 to 0.5 and below), the Granger-causality test will fail to pick the relationship.
interest rate series with properties similar to the U.S. federal funds rate.
134 The Econometrics of Interest Rate Targets
There is substantial agreement in the literature that investigates monetary policy rules (see
Taylor, 1999), that the manner in which central banks determine the level of interest rates
can be well described by the following type of rule,
r∗
t = r + βyy∗
t + βπ(πt − π∗) (6)
where r is the equilibrium interest rate, y∗
t is the output gap, and π∗ is the target level
for inﬂation. This framework, popularized by Taylor (1993), succinctly summarizes the
monetary authority’s reaction function to variations in the output gap and inﬂation and can
be easily generalized to include the exchange rate if, for example, we were thinking of a
small open economy. More sophisticated variations of the rule in (6) include speciﬁcations
based on lagged information, forecasts of the future value of the diﬀerent variables, etc.
Although this type of rule appears to ﬁt the data reasonably well, in practice, central banks
do not continuously modify their targeted level of interest rates. Rather, as Rudebusch
(1995) and Hamilton and Jorda (2000) document, the targets are seldom changed, and when
they are changed, it is in discrete increments. Section 2 presented evidence suggesting that
conventional measures of dynamic association on interest rate data depend critically on
whether or not there is directional coordination but remain silent as to whether or not there
is coordination in the timing.
A natural way to present the stochastic process that describes how interest rate targets














t ∈{ k1,..,km} is the discrete set of changes that describe the manner the target
is changed. The probability models that describe how central banks choose the timing and
magnitude of target changes can be generically expressed as

   





t = kj|Ωt−1,x i
t =1 ) = P(cj−1 < ∆ri∗





where all the variables have been deﬁned above. The next sections describe the speciﬁc
formulations of the probability models in (7).
4.1 The Timing of Target-Setting
The problem of describing when the central bank decides to change the target can be viewed
as a conventional duration process in discrete time. It is preferable to choose a discrete-time
model over a more traditional continuous-time duration model because the conditioning set
will include such variables as inﬂation, output, exchange rate, etc. whose values are updated
on a regular basis with each new release rather than remaining constant between target
changes. Therefore, the conditional hazard hi
t = P(xi
t =1 |Ωt−1), can be modeled using the
ACH model introduced in Hamilton and Jorda (2000). In particular, think of the underlying
process that generates xi
t as a linear general dynamic process,
λi











where ω,α,β,and γ are parameters, λs(t−l) is latent index, us(t−l) denotes the amount of time
that elapsed between the two most recent target changes as of time t − l, wt−1 is a vector
of exogenous and predetermined variables and s(t−l) is a time index denoting the sth most
15recent event as of time t − l and therefore, allows us to date variables in event time rather
than in calendar time.
The conditional hazard hi
t is a probability and as such, it is bounded between 0 and 1.
Thus, to close the speciﬁcation, an optional speciﬁcation of the ACH explored in Demiralp


















which can be maximized by traditional numerical techniques. Given this general formulation
of the problem, we then selected two types of variables for each country in our sample. First,
we selected variables conventionally used to describe the central bank’s choice of monetary
policy, namely, data on output growth, (typically measured by the log growth of the industrial
production index so as to maximize the frequency of observation); inﬂation measured by the
consumer price index; and exchange rates given by the nominal eﬀective exchange rate. All
three variables are at a monthly frequency and were obtained from International Financial
Statistics. The second type of variables are designed to capture any coordination in the timing
with which the G-3 central banks change their targets and they measure a transformation of
the length of time since the most recent action taken by any of the G-3.
Consequently, the speciﬁcation for the latent process λi
t described in (8) is:
λi







































We now comment on the properties of this speciﬁcation. The constant term, ωi,a b s e n t
anything else, would determine the average hazard — the average frequency with which the
target is changed in country i. us(t−1) is the duration elapsed between the two most recent
changes in country i￿s target as of time t − 1. Therefore, a positive value for αi
1 suggests
that there is a higher probability that the target will be changed if it took a long time to
modify the target between the previous two changes. βi
1 measures the degree of persistence
in changing the target, but more importantly, it allows for the eﬀect of the explanatory
variables to be dynamic in a parsimonious way by determining the exponential rate at which
the inﬂuence of the exogenous variables decays.6
The term ˜ y+
t−1 is a dummy variable indicating times when the output gap is positive, where
the gap is measured as the percentage deviation of industrial production from a log-linear
trend. The term ˜ y−
t−1 is a dummy variable indicating times when the output gap is negative.
Consequently, γi
y+ and γi
y− measure the sensitivity of the monetary authority to deviations
from trend growth which may be possibly asymmetric. Similarly, π+
t−1 is a dummy variable
indicating when CPI inﬂation is above a 2% optimal level, and π−
t−1 indicates when inﬂation
is below this target. Lastly, e+
t−1 indicates when is the percentage change in the nominal
eﬀective exchange rate index is positive, so that the domestic currency is appreciating in
value; e−
t−1indicates when is the domestic currency is depreciating.
6 See Hamilton and Jorda (2000).
17Finally, the variable D
j
t for j = US, JP, DE described in (10) is a semiparametric
indicator of the deviation of the event probability from mean of the number of days since the
last change in the jth country’s target rate. Note that z
j
t m e a s u r e st h en u m b e ro fd a y sa so f
day t, of the most recent change in country j￿s target. The variable Di
t−1 will be near zero if
a leader country has not been actively changing policy, and it will increase the more recently
the leader country has changed policy. As a result, a signiﬁcant value for the coeﬃcient φj
indicates that, once domestic and foreign factors are taken into account, the timing of target
changes is inﬂuenced by the jth central bank’s choice of target adjustments. In particular,
a negative value of this coeﬃcient would indicate that a change in the policy of a leader
country makes it more likely for the country under consideration to also change its policy.
This is because a rise in D
j
t−1 lowers the latent variable, λi
t, which raises the probability of









It is important to highlight the reasoning behind the choice of how the dependent variables
are entered into equation (9). Notice that the object of the model is to forecast the central
bank’s decision to change the target. Consequently, the eﬀect of the variables on this decision
is not that which is typical in a regression model: presumably, central banks are as likely to
react to a bad ﬁgure for output (suggestive that easing of interest rates may be needed) as
they are likely to react to a good ﬁgure for output (suggestive that more aggressive monetary
policy is needed). This justiﬁes our partition of the variable in question into positive and
negative deviations from a baseline level. The magnitude of these deviations is less critical
since at this point we are only concerned with modeling the decision to act or remain inactive.
The next section emphasizes the choice of action (raising versus lowering interest rates and
18by how much) and as we shall see, requires that we exploit the information of the explanatory
variables in a much more conventional way.
4.2 The Direction of Target-Setting
Conditional on changing the target, the central bank then needs to choose how much to
change interest rates by. This is typically done in discrete increments rather than in a
continuous manner and therefore, it is natural to represent this behavior with an ordered
response model (this corresponds to the second line in equation 7). Note that since we are
conditioning on the target being changed (i.e. xi
t =1 ) , this ordered response model is speciﬁed
in event time rather than in calendar time. This feature provides a signiﬁcant advantage:
our focus becomes interest rate movements initiated by the monetary authority, that is, the
snapshots provided by episodes in which the target was changed. Therefore, any intervening
ﬂuctuation of interest rates between target changes generated by demand disturbances and
other technical factors not associated with actual monetary policy objectives, is automatically
ﬁltered out. Market interest rates measured in calendar time by contrast, mix monetary
authority’s policy movements with demand innovations, substantially adding noise to any
measure of coordination, thus viciating the quality of conventional measures based on the
dynamic correlations.
The speciﬁcation of the conditional mean of the latent index in the ordered response
model is based on the same explanatory variables as the ACH model (i.e. the model for the
timing) and therefore can be expressed as,
P(∆ri
t = kj|Ωt−1,x i
t =1 )=P(cj−1 < ∆ri∗
t <c j|Ωt−1,x i


















The speciﬁcation in (11) simply states that changes in country i￿s target, ∆ri
t , can take only
the collection of values in the set {k1,k 2,...,km} according to the value of the conditional
mean for the index ∆ri∗
t . This conditional mean is speciﬁed as a linear function of: the output
gap for country i, yi∗
t−1, measured as percent deviations from a log-linear trend; deviations
of country i￿s inﬂation rate from a 2% target rate, (πi
t−1 −π∗); t h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nt h e
nominal eﬀective exchange rate for country i, ei
t−1; and the size of the most recent target






It is worth clarifying several points. First, we have indexed the dependent latent index
and most of the explanatory variables using the calendar index t. Note however, that the
response model is only deﬁned when xi
t =1 , which highlights why the process evolves in
event time rather than in calendar time. Consequently, when a regressor has the time index
t − 1, it refers to information available the calendar period prior to the target change. We
preferred maintaining the index t so as not to add an unnecessary layer of notation.





the magnitude of the most recent change in the U.S., German and Japanese targets as of
time t − 1. Notice that unless these targets were coincidentally changed at time t − 1, these
changes would therefore be zero. Thus, the notation s(t−1) used in the ACH model makes
explicit that our concern is with the magnitude of the most recent target changes, irrespective
of when they were changed. Finally, unlike the timing ACH model, the regressors in the
20ordered response model enter linearly. High values of the conditional mean, ∆ri∗
t , translate
into positive changes in the target having a higher probability than negative changes and
vice versa. For example, if δi
π > 0, positive deviations of inﬂation above target will make
the conditional mean higher and thus ∆ri
t > 0 more likely whereas values of inﬂation below
target will reduce the conditional mean and make ∆ri
t < 0 more likely.
The model in equations (11) and (12) requires that we make a distributional assumption
in order to specify the log-likelihood function. We follow the empirical literature in this















where c0 = −∞ (and thus Φ(c0 − Ψi￿mi
t−1)=0 ) ,c m = ∞ (and thus Φ(cm − Ψi￿mi
t−1)=1 )
and the parameters c1,...,cm−1,Ψi￿ are estimated by maximizing (13) with conventional
numerical techniques. In addition and to homogenize somewhat the discrete nature of target
changes across countries, we restricted the number of categories to four, which can be loosely
interpreted as: k1 = strong decrease, k2 = decrease, k3 = increase, k4 = strong increase.
For example, in the U.S. these categories would correspond to the following values: k1 = −0.5,
k2 = −0.25,k 3 =0 .25,k 4 =0 .5. Table 4 below reports for each country, how changes in the
target are reclassiﬁed.
5 Results
5.1 Timing Model: European Coordination
Table 5 shows results for ACH estimation of the timing model for the fourteen countries.
The macroeconomic variables are signiﬁcant for several countries, reﬂecting the important
role that inﬂation, output gaps, and exchange rates play in the setting of monetary policy
21targets. One striking observation is that the group of countries that coordinates directly
with Germany completely evaporates. The Netherlands is the only country with a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the German policy variable, and the sign of this coeﬃcient oddly is positive.
Given the speciﬁcation of the estimation equation, this implies that once we control for other
macroeconomic variables, a recent change in German policy makes a subsequent change in
Dutch policy less likely rather than more likely. This result stands in contrast to the large
group of countries that appeared to coordinate with Germany in the logit results in section
2.2. Two of the European countries previously in the Germany group, France and Austria,
show a signiﬁcant response toward industrial production and the exchange rate now instead
of toward German policy. Given the role of industrial production, one implication is that
part of the apparent coordination observed in the previous section may have been illusory.
Monetary policy in France and Austria were responding to domestic economic conditions,
and it so happened that business cycles in these two countries in many ways resemble those
in their common neighbor, Germany.
Given the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the exchange rate, another implication is that France
and Austria were in part acting to stabilize their exchange rates, perhaps as part of their
role in the EMS and ERM. This is quite plausible for France, since it was a long-standing
member in European exchange rate arrangements. Since Austria joined the ERM late in
our sample, it may indicate Austria was using monetary policy to stabilize its exchange
r a t ew e l lb e f o r ei tw a sp a r to ft h i sm e c h a n i s m ,o ri ts i m p l yh a dp r e f e r e n c e sf o ras t a b l e
exchange rate. While conceptually distinct from the type of direct policy coordination we
are seeking, this still may be regarded as a type of policy coordination, and it is not diﬃcult
22to consider a case in which this could erroneously be picked up by our simple logits as
coordination. Suppose Germany has changed its monetary policy target in response to
large domestic shocks, such as uniﬁcation, and suppose these neighboring countries have
adjusted their targets to maintain a stable eﬀective exchange rate level. This would imply
these neighboring countries would adjust their monetary policies in similar direction to that
undertaken by Germany. It should also be noted that our estimates here by deﬁnition will
not pick up cases of sterilized intervention, since we focus only on cases where the target
interest rate was actually changed. Further, while it would be interesting to estimate the
model over various subsamples here, the data we use limits us in this regard, since the target
rate data is available for fairly short periods for many countries.
The results also oﬀer additional insight into the workings of the ERM during the sample
period. One is that the ERM was not as one-sided as the story above might indicate, in
that German policy responded to exchange rates, just as did its neighbors. True, Germany’s
most signiﬁcant response is toward its domestic CPI, but the estimates also indicate a very
signiﬁcant response to exchange rate as well. The estimates do not permit us to gauge the
relative magnitude of German and French responses to exchange rates, since the values here
simply measure the probably of a response without reference to the size of this response.
5.2 Coordination with the U.S.
Results on coordination with the U.S. show an interesting contrast with those on coordination
within Europe. While introducing macro variables and dynamics appeared above to reduce
the direct coordination in Europe, it elicits a greater degree of coordination with the U.S.
In contrast to the simple logits of Table 2, Table 5 now shows clear coordination among the
23G-3 countries. Both Germany and Japan appear to respond to German policy when setting
their monetary policy targets. One explanation would be that these countries experience
quite diﬀerent shocks from the U.S., so that their monetary policy actions in general diﬀer
f r o mt h o s ei nt h eU . S .B u to n c et h e s ed o m e s t i cr e a c t i o n sa r er e m o v e d ,t h er e m a i n i n gp o l i c y
actions left unexplained by domestic factors do coincide with policy actions taken in the U.S.
It is true, on the other hand, that the UK and Australia now appear not to coordinate
with the U.S. Again the likely explanation is that these economies, which share a more Anglo
economic structure, may be responding to domestic shocks that happen to be more similar
to those in the U.S., rather than indicating actual coordination. These two countries also
respond signiﬁcantly to the exchange rate, so it is possible their apparent coordination with
the U.S. reﬂected a concern to maintain a stable exchange rate, since the U.S. is a large
trading partner.
As in the case of European coordination, coordination with the U.S. is not completely
one sided. It is true that results do not indicate the U.S. responds directly to the policies of
Germany or Japan, so that in this sense it satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a leader of the G3 group.
However, it does respond very signiﬁcantly to the exchange rate, and as discussed above, this
could be interpreted to indicate a type of indirect coordination with other countries. The
only other country in our sample beside the U.S. to show no direct coordination with any
other country in any of our estimations is Switzerland.
The results show one other interesting observation with regard to exchange rate interven-
tion. Far more countries appear to respond with unsterilized intervention in the case where
the nominal eﬀective exchange rate is rising than when it is falling, and in those countries
24that respond to exchange rate changes of both directions, the result is more signiﬁcant for
positive changes. Given that the exchange rate is measured here as an index, this indi-
cates cases where the currency is appreciating. This may indicate a greater willingness to
intervene, or simply a greater willingness to forego sterilization when intervening against an
appreciating domestic currency.
5.3 Formal Agreements
Given that we ﬁnd evidence of direct policy coordination, it is reasonable to ask whether
this can be ascribed to formal coordination agreements. This is a question that has been
addressed in recent work by Dominguez (1997), and we utilize the data set she compiles on the
timing of oﬃcial coordination agreements. Dominguez studied the communiques produced
from meetings of the G7, G-5 and G3 dating from 1975 to 1993, and identiﬁed when there
w a sac a l lf o rac o o r d i n a t e de ﬀ o r tt or e d u c ei n ﬂ a t i o no rl o w e ri n t e r e s tr a t e s .A sd e s c r i b e db y
Dominguez, commitments to ﬁght inﬂation coincide with periods where actual inﬂation is
rather high, beginning with the ﬁrst summit in 1975 through the London Summit in 1984, and
again from mid 1988 to April 1989. The focus shifted to economic growth and commitments
to lower interest rates in 1986, 1987, 1991 and 1992. Overall, Dominguez identiﬁes in the
sample ﬁfteen cases of commitments to lower inﬂation and nineteen commitments to lower
interest rates.
We incorporate Dominguez’s listings into our ACH estimation methodology. One diﬀer-
e n c ei st h a tw ec a no n l yu s eh e rs e r i e sb a c kt o1 9 8 0a tt h em o s t ,g i v e nt h a to u rt a r g e tr a t e
series at most go back this far. Also, given that the ACH methodology does not distinguish
between expansionary and contractionary policy shifts, we combine the two types of agree-
25ments into a single dummy variable. This dummy is a monthly series that takes a value of 1
during a month were a summit calls for coordinated action of any type. (Note that the ACH
methodology allows for a complex lag structure that can accommodate persistent eﬀects of
summit meetings on policy decisions in the months following a summit.)
Table 6 shows result for the G-5 countries. These particular countries were tested, pri-
marily because they were the only ones with target data series going back suﬃciently far
to make the exercise feasible, given that the Dominguez variable ends already in 1993. As
can be seen in the table, we can detect a response to the agreement dummy variable only
f o rt h ec a s eo fF r a n c e ,a n dn o tf o rt h eo t h e rf o u rc o u n t r i e s .T h i si sd e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tw e
still pick up signiﬁcant coordination with the U.S. for the cases of Germany and Japan. We
conclude that coordination may well work through other, less oﬃcial channels than formal
agreements. Alternatively, since we are controlling already for inﬂation and output gaps in
our estimation, and the agreements typically correspond with times when these two vari-
ables are problematic for these countries, the eﬀects of the dummies in our estimation may
be diluted.
5.4 Results of the Directional Model
While the ACH results discussed above can be used to measure the probability of a policy
change, they are silent when it comes to questions of how large these policy changes are, or
whether these changes are sensible in terms of sign. To investigate these particular aspects of
coordination, we employ a diﬀerent but more familiar methodology, that of ordered probits.
Results of the timing model estimations are presented in Table 7. Our ﬁrst task is to
conﬁrm that our data implies sensible signs for policy responses. Seven of the countries show
26a signiﬁcant response to the nominal exchange rate index, and six of these coeﬃcients are
negative. This result is sensible, since it implies that when the domestic currency has been
appreciating, countries tend to respond by lowering the interest rate target. All ﬁve cases
of signiﬁcant response to industrial production are positive. This too is sensible, implying
that countries respond to unusually strong growth by raising their interest rate target. More
puzzling is the fact that a number countries appear to lower their interest rates in response
to unusually high CPI inﬂation. One explanation is that central banks respond to antici-
pated future inﬂation more than to lagged or current inﬂation, and the positive response to
industrial production growth rates reported above may be capturing this eﬀect. Finally, the
responses to foreign policy variables are almost all positive, which is sensible, indicating that
countries tend to move in the same direction as their policy leader.
A second issue to investigate is a question that arose in section 5.1 above. We found
that Germany had a signiﬁcant response to the exchange rate as did other members of
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, suggesting a more symmetric relationship in the
ERM than was previously thought. Ordered probit results again show a German response
to exchange rates that is statistically signiﬁcant, but now we see that the magnitude of
this response is much less than that of any of the other European countries who show a
statistically signiﬁcant response to the exchange rate. In particular, the Germany response
coeﬃcient of -0.24 is much less (in absolute value) than the -0.62 coeﬃcient for France.
Next we note that the groupings by leader are in some ways diﬀerent from that suggested
by the ACH results. Most prominently, the group of countries coordinating directly with
Germany is larger, now including Austria, Belgium France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain
27and the U.K. Although the exchange rate is included in these regressions, the ordered probit
m e t h o d o l o g ys e e m sl e s sa b l et op i c ku pt h er e s p o n s e st ot h i sv a r i a b l et h a nw a st h eA C H
methodology, and this may explain why there is more direct coordination left after controlling
for the exchange rate. Also, the group coordinating with the U.S. is smaller, including only
Germany, and perhaps Japan, which is just on the far side of signiﬁcance at the 90% level.
Finally, we can measure which countries in Europe respond most strongly to the German
lead. The coeﬃcients on German policy are strongest for Austria and Italy, followed by
France and Spain. It is also notable that Germany appears here to coordinate with Japan
as well as with the U.S., with coeﬃcients similar in magnitude.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has re-examined the issue of international macroeconomic policy coordination,
taking advantage of recent developments in empirical methods used in the closed-economy
literature to study monetary policy rules. This methodology, referred to as the Autoregressive
Conditional Hazard model, allows us to make eﬀective use of data on actual policy targets
set by central banks, rather than relying on interest rates set in the marketplace. This allows
us to ﬁlter out the eﬀects of demand shocks in ﬁnancial markets, and focus directly on the
intentions of policy makers. We also avoid some pitfalls of VARs and Granger Causality
tests, which we demonstrate can mask coordination that is present in the data.
When applied to data on policy targets for fourteen industrialized countries, the ACH
methodology does identify clear signs of policy coordination over the period 1980-1998. Fur-
ther, two clusters can be identiﬁed, respectively led by the U.S. and Germany. Much of the
coordination of European countries with Germany appears to be a response to exchange rates
28rather than a direct response to German policy per se, presumably reﬂecting the exchange
rate arrangements of the period. We also detect a cluster of countries that coordinate with
the U.S., including Germany and Japan. This coordination of macro policies appears to be
more direct, in that it cannot be attributed to countries responding to exchange rates or to
domestic macro variables that happen to be similar. Finally, the results do not ascribe a
large role to explicit coordination agreements, such as G-7 summits, but instead suggest that
coordination tends to work through less explicit channels.
This evidence stands in contrast to the recent theoretical re-exploration of international
policy coordination. While recent work adopting the microfoundations of the “new open
economy macroeconomics” does ﬁnd potential beneﬁts of coordination, this theoretical work
seems currently to conclude that the gains are likely to be very small in magnitude. Clearly
this calls for empirical investigation. Given that this paper ﬁnds empirical evidence that
many countries do in practice coordinate their monetary policies to some degree, this raises
the question of whether the theoretical models perhaps may be missing some element that
makes such coordination worthwhile. Future empirical work using the present methodology
could help guide continued theoretical research by exploring what factors lead some countries
to coordinate more than others. Depending on data limitations, future work should also
consider various sub-periods of the sample, to explore conditions under which a particular
country is more likely to coordinate.
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31Table 1 - Summary of the Data Definitions 
 
COUNTRY  Operational Monetary Data  Codes 
Sample 
Begins  Macro-International Data  Frequency 
Australia 
•  Unofficial cash rate 





GDP, CPI, Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate (NEER) 
Quarterly (up to 
7/98), monthly 
Austria 
•  Day-to-day money 
•  Short-term operations (GOMEX) 











•  Overnight interbank deposits 





IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Canada 
•  Overnight rate 





IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
France 
•  Day-to-day rate 
•  Tender rate 







IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Germany 
•  Day-to-day rate 
•  Repo rate 







IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Italy 
•  Overnight interbank deposits 
•  3-month interbank 







IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Japan 
•  Overnight call money rate 





IP (up to 5/98), CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Netherlands 
•  Call money 
•  Rate on special advances 







IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Spain 
•  Overnight interbank deposits 





IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Sweden 
•  Day-to-day money 





IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Switzerland 
•  Day-to-day money (tomorrow next) 





GDP. CPI, NEER  Quarterly, 
monthly 
U.K. 
•  Overnight sterling interbank deposits 





IP (up to 7/98), CPI, NEER  Monthly 
U.S. 
•  Federal funds rate  





IP, CPI, NEER  Monthly 
Note: Target rates in bold and italic.  Table 2 - Hazard Estimates from a simple Logit model with target dummies for Germany, Japan and the U.S. as dependent 






  Austria  Australia  Belgium  Canada  Switz.  Germany  Spain  France  Italy  Japan  Nether.  Sweden  UK  US 
Baseline  0.04  0.04  0.13  0.12  0.81  0.24  0.11  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.15  0.19  0.10  0.11 
Germany  0.24*  0.05  0.57*  0.22  0.76  0.24  0.13  0.21*  0.10  0.03  0.35*  0.18  0.05**  0.09 
Japan  0.09  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.87  0.27  0.09  0.08  0.10  0.03  0.23  0.34  0.17  0.11 
US  0.10*  0.13*  0.19  0.70*  0.89  0.22  0.07  0.07  0.31*  0.03  0.29*  0.29  0.12  0.11 
Note:  Baseline measures the probability that in any given week the target will be changed. Germany, Japan, US measure this probability when in 
addition Germany, Japan and U.S. change their target. 
* means significant at the 95% level. 







  Austria  Australia  Belgium  Canada  Switz.  Germany  Spain  France  Italy  Japan  Nether.  Sweden  UK  US 
Baseline  0.02  0.15  0.12  0.55  0.76  0.49  0.36  0.23  0.27  0.07  0.36  0.45  0.31  0.34 
Germany  0.56*  0.11  0.79*  0.44  0.71  0.49  0.55**  0.43*  0.42  0.16  0.70*  0.45  0.20  0.42 
Japan  0.01  0.23  0.11  1.00  0.73  0.70**  0.18  0.15  0.20  0.07  0.59  0.50  0.26  0.33 
US  0.01  0.34*  0.30**  0.59  0.82  0.57  0.44  0.24  0.30  0.07  0.33  0.43  0.54*  0.34 
Note:  Baseline measures the probability that in any given week the target will be changed. Germany, Japan, US measure this probability when in 
addition Germany, Japan and U.S. change their target. 
* means significant at the 95% level. 
** means significant at the 90% level. 
 Table 3 – Monte-Carlo Experiments 
 
 




Frequency A/and B 
Directional 
Correlation - y 
B Granger-causes A 
p-value 
A Granger-causes B 
p-value 
0.4  0.403/0.400  0.99  0.0185  0.6570 
    0.75  0.0393  0.6700 
    0.50  0.1316  0.6927 
    0.25  0.4045  0.7001 
    0.00  0.6140  0.6894 
0.3  0.304/0.301  0.99  0.0864  0.6264 
    0.75  0.1280  0.6446 
    0.50  0.2573  0.6679 
    0.25  0.4982  0.6908 
    0.00  0.6322  0.6768 
0.2  0.202/0.199  0.99  0.2658  0.6306 
    0.75  0.3302  0.6256 
    0.50  0.4498  0.6363 
    0.25  0.5989  0.6428 
    0.00  0.6560  0.6348 
Note: r
A = r
B = 0.5, g
A = g




Changing the Correlation in the Timing – Directional Correlation y = 0.75 
Timing Correlation - b  B Granger-causes A 
p-value 




0.25  0.0392  0.6638  0.403 
0.5  0.0410  0.6553  0.402 
0.75  0.0408  0.6488  0.401 
0.99  0.0427  0.6453  0.401 
Note: r
A = r
B = 0.5, g
A = g




Changing the Variance of the Errors around the Target - b = 0.99, y = 0.99 
sA = sB =  B Granger-causes A: p-value  A Granger-causes B: p-value 
1  0.4387  0.5016 
0.5  0.1583  0.5682 
0.25  0.0207  0.6204 
0.1  0.0151  0.6293 
Note: r
A = r
B = 0.5, g
A = g
B = 0.5, sA = sB = 0.25, Empirical Frequency for A = 0.400, B = 0.400 Table 3 (Contd.) 
 
 
Changing the Autocorrelation of the Timing Process – b = 0.75, y = 0.75 
r A = r B =  B Granger-causes A 
p-value 






0.9  0.1227  0.5967  0.332  0.302 
0.75  0.1304  0.6117  0.306  0.301 
0.5  0.1231  0.6270  0.304  0.301 
0.25  0.1225  0.6282  0.303  0.301 
0  0.1325  0.6215  0.303  0.301 
Note:  g
A = g
B = 0.5, sA = sB = 0.25. 
 
 
Changing the Autocorrelation of the Directional Process - b = 0.75, y = 0.75 
g
A = g
B =  B Granger-causes A: p-value  A Granger-causes B: p-value 
0.9  0.1084  0.4319 
0.75  0.1096  0.5320 
0.5  0.1231  0.6270 
0.25  0.1941  0.6500 
0  0.2374  0.6609 
Note:r
A = r
B = 0.5, sA = sB = 0.25, Empirical Frequency for A = 0.303, B = 0.301 
 
Equations of the Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
rt
i = r t
i + Pit Pit i N￿0,ai





i + ￿1 ? xt
i￿￿r t?1





i = 1,It?1￿ = P￿cj?1 < Art
iD < cj|xt
i = 1,It?1￿ j = 1,2,...,m  
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 Table 4 – Classification of Target Changes 
 
 
Country  k1 = strong 
decrease 
k2 =  decrease  k3 = increase  k4 = strong 
increase 
Australia  75 . 0 - < D t r   0 75 . 0 £ D £ - t r   75 . 0 0 £ D < t r   t r D  > 0.75 
Austria  5 . 0 - < D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D £ - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.5  t r D  > 0.5 
Belgium  5 . 0 - < D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D £ - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.5  t r D  > 0.5 
Canada  5 . 0 - £ D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D < - t r   0 <  t r D  < 0.5  t r D  ‡ 0.5 
France  4 . 0 - £ D t r   0 4 . 0 £ D < - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.4  t r D  > 0.4 
Germany  4 . 0 - £ D t r   0 4 . 0 £ D < - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.4  t r D  > 0.4 
Italy  5 . 0 - < D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D £ - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.5  t r D  > 0.5 
Japan  5 . 0 - < D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D £ - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.5  t r D  > 0.5 
Netherlands  4 . 0 - £ D t r   0 4 . 0 £ D < - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.4  t r D  > 0.4 
Spain  5 . 0 - < D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D £ - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.5  t r D  > 0.5 
Sweden  3 . 0 - £ D t r   0 3 . 0 £ D < - t r   0 <  t r D  < 0.3  t r D  ‡ 0.3 
U.K.  5 . 0 - < D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D £ - t r   0 <  t r D  £ 0.5  t r D  > 0.5 
U.S.  5 . 0 - £ D t r   0 5 . 0 £ D < - t r   0 <  t r D  < 0.5  t r D  ‡ 0.5 
   Table 5: ACH Estimation Results
Australia Austria Belgium Canada France Germany Italy
constant 0.557 -0.125 -2.577 4.130** -0.022 5.560* 0.985
  (0.538) (0.621) (1.842) (3.148) (0.421) (2.175) (1.268)
duration 0.336 -0.321 -- 0.093 -0.178 -0.245 --
  (0.402) (0.293)   (0.626) (0.196) (0.264)
r 0.869* 0.823* -- -0.725* 0.725* -0.217 --
  (0.094) (0.126)   (0.199) (0.151) (0.503)
output (positive) -0.102 0.1441** 0.012 0.282 0.1523** -0.023 0.416**
  (0.537) (0.104) (0.070) (0.840) (0.112) (0.130) (0.300)
output (negative) 0.009 0.020 -0.004 -0.513 0.104 0.244* 0.015
  (0.457) (0.054) (0.039) (0.571) (0.119) (0.176) (0.141)
CPI (positive) 0.268 -- -- -- -- -1.897* 1.194
  (0.384)     (0.980) (1.120)
CPI (negative) 1.206** 0.238 0.514 0.922 -0.365 -3.694* 1.495
  (0.880) (0.418) (1.156) (2.689) (0.509) (1.397) (1.443)
exchange rate 0.345* -0.323* -0.150 0.089 0.220** -0.727* -0.031
(positive) (0.150) (0.192) (0.447) (0.957) (0.152) (0.378) (0.217)
exchange rate -0.361** -0.167 0.649 0.741 -0.4564** -0.204 0.174**
(negative) (0.254) (0.605) (0.671) (0.681) (0.320) (0.350) (0.128)
German policy 2.481 0.670 5.229 -1.479 1.533   -2.016
  (4.097) (1.017) (3.216) (4.971) (1.524)   (2.952)
Japanese policy -5.836** -0.868 4.160 -8.330 -0.062 0.323 -2.286
  (4.414) (1.395) (3.098) (9.051) (1.686) (2.412) (3.549)
U.S. policy -0.645 0.477 -2.795 -7.114 -0.416 -4.529* -3.147**
  (0.968) (0.918) (2.409) (5.692) (1.318) (2.184) (0.234)
Date range: 1/90-7/98 6/85-7/98 1/91-7/98 4/94-7/98 9/88-7/98 9/91-7/98 1/91-7/98
Standard errors in parentheses.  * Indicates significant at the 95% level;  ** indicates significant at the 90% level. 
-- indicates that this variable was excluded because the estimation would not converge when it was included.Table 5 continued
Japan Nethlds Spain Sweden Switz. U.K. U.S.
constant 6.061* -1.585 -1.643 -15.092* -1.802 4.070 0.904
  (2.250) (1.281) (1.740) (5.870) (1.543) (1.800) (0.711)
duration 2.704* -- 0.177 -- -0.550 -0.140 -0.169
  (1.195)   (1.605)   (0.874) (0.300) (0.157)
r -0.8814* -- 0.275 -- 0.214 -0.249** 0.792
  (0.051)   (0.336)   (0.273) (0.180) (0.123)
output (positive) 0.002 0.016 0.178 1.887* 0.199** -0.497* -0.120**
  (0.147) (0.023) (0.163) (0.924) (0.138) (0.282) (0.080)
output (negative) 0.094 -0.002 0.165 -0.211 -0.067 0.026 -0.010
  (0.222) (0.028) (0.148) (0.944) (0.148) (0.228) (0.034)
CPI (positive) -- -- 0.667 -- -69.892 3.079* -0.184
    (0.765) (771.942) (1.481) (0.226)
CPI (negative) -0.539 -0.394 1.786** -4.440** 0.613 2.661* -0.153
  (1.236) (0.627) (1.147) (2.385) (1.010) (1.576) (0.399)
exchange rate 0.135 0.378 -0.477 1.443 0.771* -1.020* 0.350*
(positive) (0.208) (0.257) (0.583) (0.915) (0.394) (0.399) (0.134)
exchange rate 0.236 -0.595 0.019 -1.605 -0.309 0.526* -0.020
(negative) (0.210) (0.432) (0.170) (1.131) (0.296) (0.314) (0.056)
German policy -3.978 4.359* -1.335 16.849** 1.118 1.247 -1.014
  (3.216) (1.746) (2.242) (10.108) (2.797) (2.107) (0.837)
Japanese policy   1.313 0.573 -13.544 -4.465 -4.997** -0.627
    (2.091) (3.262) (11.114) (4.453) (3.114) (0.729)
U.S. policy -6.4363* -2.061 0.382 40.668* -1.116 -1.534  
  (4.528) (1.418) (1.892) (16.554) (1.884) (2.099)  
Date range: 9/86-7/98 6/86-7/98 11/90-7/98 10/94-7/98 06/89-7/98 9/91-7/98 1/88-7/98
Standard errors in parentheses.  * Indicates significant at the 95% level;  ** indicates significant at the 90% level. 
-- indicates that this variable was excluded because the estimation would not converge when it was included.  Table 6: ACH Estimation Results with Agreement Indicator
France Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
constant 24.718** 1.047 11.297* -3.567 1.138
  (15.494) (2.887) (3.390) (3.341) (2.278)
duration 0.864** -0.157 0.596 -1.197** -0.304
  (0.539) (0.335) (1.107) (0.794) (0.305)
r 0.174 -0.107 -0.850* 0.482* 0.990*
  (0.185) (0.270) (0.103) (0.186) (0.384)
output (positive) 0.917 -0.106 -0.138 -0.085 0.053
  (0.745) (0.159) (0.200) (0.319) (0.187)
output (negative) 0.293 0.313 0.181 -0.016 -0.059
  (0.715) (0.318) (0.266) (0.232) (0.092)
CPI (positive) -- -1.223** -- 2.037 -0.263
    (0.873)   (2.417) (0.571)
CPI (negative) -8.070* -2.235** 0.724 2.851 -0.350
  (3.773) (1.413) (1.809) (2.888) (0.867)
exchange rate -2.399* -0.492 -0.207 -0.625 0.156
(positive) (0.852) (0.500) (0.215) (0.669) (0.351)
exchange rate 7.410* 6.285* 0.538* 0.683** -0.005
(negative) (2.917) (2.836) (0.260) (0.454) (0.153)
German policy -13.328   -5.490** 6.422* 0.322
  (11.780)   (3.577) (3.667) (2.318)
Japanese policy -16.111* -0.542   -0.144 -1.229
  (8.837) (4.907) (3.638) (2.420)
U.S. policy 2.374 6.149** -14.977* 1.092  
  (8.487) (3.913) (5.662) (3.296)  
Agreement Indicator 1.418** 0.148 0.385 -0.677 -0.656
  (1.051) (0.603) (0.422) (0.779) (0.798)
Date range: 9/88-12/93 9/91-12/93 9/86-12/93 9/91-12/93 1/88-12/93
Standard errors in parentheses.  * Indicates significant at the 95% level;  ** indicates significant at the 90% level. 
-- indicates that this variable was excluded because the estimation would not converge when it was included.  Table 7: Ordered Probit Results
Australia Austria Belgium Canada France Germany Italy
output 0.182 -0.011 -0.033 0.178 0.348* 0.151* 0.038
  (0.516) (0.087) (0.080) (0.443) (0.149) (0.045) (0.179)
CPI -1.034** -0.806 0.099 -0.088 1.646 -0.501* 0.302
  (0.533) (1.019) (0.854) (1.407) (1.165) (0.238) (0.644)
exchange rate 0.156 -0.400 -0.163 -0.685* -0.623* -0.236* -0.016
(0.128) (0.379) (0.158) (0.411) (0.255) (0.106) (0.090)
German policy -- 1.369* 0.787* 0.193 0.897**   1.384*
  (0.448) (0.324) (0.525) (0.499) (0.556)
Japanese policy -- -- 0.213 -- 0.175 0.403* -1.780*
  (0.259) (0.316) (0.152) (0.526)
U.S. policy -- 0.134 0.034 -0.070 0.352 0.345* 0.892*
  (0.358) (0.248) (0.365) (0.387) (0.158) (0.363)
Date range: 1/90-7/98 6/85-7/98 1/91-7/98 4/94-7/98 9/88-7/98 9/91-7/98 1/91-7/98
Japan Nethlds Spain Sweden Switz. U.K. U.S.
output (positive) 0.234 0.025* 0.026 -- 0.007 0.358* 0.139*
  (0.154) (0.010) (0.066) (0.063) (0.097) (0.050)
CPI (positive) -1.077 -1.003* 0.207 2.248* -0.002 -0.150 -0.532**
  (1.465) (0.461) (0.326) (0.911) (0.024) (0.279) (0.321)
exchange rate -0.301* -.337* 0.126 -0.726* -0.049 0.013 0.097**
  (0.110) (0.126) (0.121) (0.235) (0.034) (0.051) (0.052)
German policy -0.399 0.451* 0.896* -- -0.100 0.574* -0.198
  (0.634) (0.183) (0.347) (0.319) (0.234) (0.183)
Japanese policy   0.393* -0.264 -- 0.111 -0.396 -0.523*
    (0.158) (0.260) (0.121) (0.242) (0.019)
U.S. policy 0.759 0.178 0.433 -- 0.088 0.205  
  (0.480) (0.160) (0.269) (0.264) (0.220)  
Date range: 9/86-7/98 6/86-7/98 11/90-7/98 10/94-7/98 06/89-7/98 9/91-7/98 1/88-7/98
Standard errors in parentheses.  * Indicates significant at the 95% level;  ** indicates significant at the 90% level. 
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Note: Whenever target and overnight data are indistinguishable, we use dual scales.
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Figure 2 - Example of Monte Carlo Generated
Interest Rate Series
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